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Abstract 
The imposition of corporate liability is problematic in terms of both conviction and 
sentencing. Once convicted, it is still difficult to effectively sanction a corporation, as the 
artificial nature of the entity means it cannot be imprisoned. This problem is illustrated by the 
Pike River disaster and the relevant corporation’s conviction for nine health and safety 
offences. In that case, the defendant was insolvent, so no effective financial penalty could be 
imposed. This paper will consider the range of sanctions that could be used to effectively 
punish a guilty corporate defendant. A starting point for corporate sentencing would be the 
imposition of a financial penalty (both reparation orders and fines). However, if the company 
is insolvent, this may be ineffective. There are several mechanisms which could be used to 
overcome the issue of insolvency, but the court should also consider various non-financial 
penalties and the imposition of sanctions against individuals. The court may be able to 
adequately punish a company if a variety of penalties is used. 
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I Introduction 
 
The New Zealand criminal justice system focuses on finding individuals liable and 
sanctioning at a personal level.1 This approach becomes problematic when a corporation is 
held criminally responsible.2 Firstly, at the conviction stage, it is difficult to attribute the 
elements of an offence to the company.3 In addition, even if a company can be convicted, 
there are also problems at the sentencing stage. It can be challenging to impose an effective 
sanction. A great deal of literature focuses on the issues with conviction, but less emphasis is 
placed on the problematic issue of corporate sentencing.4 A company is an artificial 
construct,5 but there still needs to be a way to appropriately sentence an entity because it can 
still cause harm. This problem is particularly evident when a company is responsible for loss 
of human life. Where this occurs there is substantial public interest to ensure that the 
corporation takes responsibility for any fault which caused death. Therefore, the courts need 
to impose a different set of penalties in order to effectively sanction a guilty corporate 
defendant. This paper focuses on the challenges in sentencing should a corporation be 
convicted. There will be emphasis on cases that involve the loss of life, as when courts need 
to sentence an entity convicted of the highest level of harm, many sentencing problems are 
exacerbated. 
 
The recent case of Department of Labour v Pike River Coal Ltd illustrates the problems 
inherent in sentencing a corporation and discusses possible solutions. The corporation was 
involved in negligent and risky practices which led to the deaths of 29 miners. Charges were 
brought under health and safety legislation (as a charge of corporate manslaughter is 
currently unavailable in New Zealand).6 In the case, sentencing issues were particularly 
cogent as the company was found responsible for loss of life.  
 
																																																								
1 Sentencing Act 2002, s 7. 
2 The terms “company” and “corporation” are used interchangeably in this paper. The term “legal person” has 
also been used at times to draw comparisons to a “natural person” (i.e. a human being). 
3 Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission [1994] 2 NZLR 291 at [7]-[8]. 
4 Andrew Ashworth Principles of Criminal Law (6th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) at 152-154. 
5 Companies Act 1993, s 15. 
6 Department of Labour v Pike River Coal Ltd [2014] DCR 32 at [2]-[3]. 
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Wherever serious physical harm is caused, the usual recourse is a sentence of imprisonment.7 
This is impossible for a corporation. Following the company’s nine convictions for breaches 
of the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992, Farish J combined a reparation order in 
the sum of $3.41 million to be paid to the victims’ families with a fine of $760,000 to be paid 
to the government.8  However, the company had become insolvent and could not pay these 
financial penalties. In a case where the company cannot pay, the judge can exercise discretion 
and choose not to impose the penalty.9  In this case, the judge declined to use this 
discretion.10  She responded by encouraging the directors and shareholders to contribute their 
own personal funds to cover the debt.11  However, this expectation could not be legally 
enforced and individual members of management refused to contribute. The outcome of the 
sentencing judgment was that no effective sanction had been placed on the company.12  The 
unsatisfactory outcome in the Pike River case provides the impetus for this paper. If a broader 
variety of sentencing options were available, the court may have been able to impose a more 
adequate sanction. 
 
As many sanctions were designed to be imposed only on natural persons, the sentencing of a 
“legal person” such as a corporation is difficult. Courts are unable to impose a period of 
imprisonment,13 so instead need to develop other sentencing options, including both financial 
and non-financial penalties. This paper introduces the concept of corporate liability and 
discusses the rationale for its use. Focus then shifts to an analysis of the various sentencing 
options. This analysis begins with an examination of possible financial penalties – reparation 
orders and fines. Difficulties with their use are then assessed. Possible solutions to the 
specific problem of sentencing an insolvent corporation are examined, then consideration is 
given to some alternatives to financial compensation. These alternatives focus on restorative 
justice, social stigmatisation, and ensuring the harm does not reoccur. Focus then shifts to the 
imposition of penalties directly on to the individuals involved. It is ultimately concluded that 
a range of financial and non-financial sanctions should be used in conjunction to effectively 
sentence a company. Further, it is argued that the court should also consider the individual 
																																																								
7 Crimes Act 1961, s 177. 
8 At [41]. 
9 Sentencing Act, s 41. 
10 At [40]. 
11 At [19]-[20]. 
12 “Pike River ruling proves need for corporate manslaughter law – unions” ONE News (New Zealand, 5 July 
2013) <tvnz.co.nz>. 
13 Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 6. 
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circumstances of each company, such as their wealth base, ability to collect money from 
individuals, whether they are going to continue trading, and if so, whether they can rebrand 
following conviction. 
 
II Rationale for Corporate Liability 
 
Despite the problems inherent in convicting and sentencing a company as a whole, corporate 
liability is beneficial in two significant ways. One advantage of allowing a corporation to be 
convicted of a criminal offence is that it promotes public welfare. It is important to be able to 
effectively criminalise corporate conduct because harm is still being caused. This public 
interest is especially applicable where the charges are based on health and safety violations, 
as these offences involve danger to personal safety.14 A criminal conviction would stigmatise 
an entity in a way that a civil claim could not.15 The public would be likely to respond to the 
fact of this conviction and both the reputation and the revenue of the corporation would 
suffer. This would provide an important incentive for companies to ensure workers are 
protected. Ross Wilson has argued the using a harsh criminal offence is therefore in the best 
interests of vulnerable workers.16 Companies would have an added incentive to ensure 
regulations are followed. In addition, public prosecution is beneficial as it removes the need 
for personal retribution. 
 
Another important reason to attribute criminal liability to a company is the inherent difficulty 
in finding individuals liable. In some situations, a court can be unable to find individuals 
guilty and therefore, corporate liability is the only option for ascribing blame. The main 
problem with finding individual liability is that it can sometimes be too difficult to attribute a 
causative link from the actions of a single person to the harm caused.17 Systemic failures 
within the company may be the substantial cause of death, and it would be too difficult to 
attribute blame to one or more individuals.18 For example, when the MS Herald of Free 
Enterprise capsized after launch due to a bow-door being left open, blame could not be 
																																																								
14 Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992, s 6. 
15 Eric Rasmusen “Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality” (1996) 39 Journal of Law and 
Economics 519 at 519-521. 
16 Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy Final Overview: Volume 2 (Department of Internal 
Affairs, October 2012) at 266-269. 
17 RB Whittingham The Blame Machine: Why Human Error Causes Accidents (Elsevier Butterworth-
Heinemann, United Kingdom, 2004) at 120-121. 
18 R v P & O Ferries (Dover) Ltd (1991) 93 Cr App Rep 72 (Herald of Free Enterprise). 
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ascribed to one individual. The second officer was under a duty to shut the door, the first 
officer was under a duty to check the door was shut, and the captain is traditionally liable for 
all problems. In that situation, it was only practicable to charge the company as a whole with 
an offence.19 
 
III Aims of Sentencing 
 
Even if the issues with conviction can be adequately addressed, it can still be difficult to 
impose an effective sentence on a corporation following a finding of guilt. This research 
focuses on three main possible sanctions: financial penalties, non-financial penalties, and 
individual penalties. Financial penalties can be imposed, but these may be difficult to 
administer in situations where the company has become insolvent because they lack capacity 
to pay. In addition, companies with a large amount of wealth may be able to effectively 
purchase the right to break the law, as the penalties represent only a small fraction of their 
wealth base. Non-financial penalties have been imposed in other jurisdictions, such as the 
United Kingdom, but the adequacy of these penalties is also an issue, especially where the 
company ceases to trade following the imposition of a sentence. The court could also 
consider imposing a sentence on the individuals involved, despite the corporation as a whole 
being convicted. Ideally, these sentencing options should be developed by Parliament, but 
consideration will be given to mechanisms the court could use within the scope of the current 
legislation. 
 
In addition, consideration is given to the distinction between sentencing a corporation 
convicted of a regulatory offence and one convicted of a true crime. Problems with 
sentencing are always present, but these issues are intensified when the offence involves 
serious injury or loss of life. Following conviction for a regulatory offence, one of the 
aforementioned sentencing options may be appropriate. However, the traditional penalty for a 
more serious crime such as culpable homicide is the imposition of a term of imprisonment 
and the government has indicated that this is desirable.20 This is not available for a 
corporation. The corporation is an artificial construct designed to assist effective commercial 
																																																								
19 The company was charged with manslaughter but was later acquitted. 
20 (3 December 2013) 695 NZPD 15118. 
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practice and therefore, it cannot be imprisoned.21 On this basis, one issue with expanding 
corporate liability to cover serious offences such as manslaughter would be the problem 
inherent in sentencing a company for this, when true crimes were designed to be committed 
by only natural people.22 
 
Initially, the court should consider the six purposes of sentencing which must be assessed, as 
different penalties focus on various aims. These are: retribution, denunciation, deterrence, 
incapacitation, rehabilitation, and restitution.23 Retribution and denunciation focus on 
punishing the defendant and condemning the conduct.24 Deterrence focuses on generally 
discouraging this type of conduct and specifically dissuading the current defendant from 
reoffending.25 Incapacitation seeks to protect society by preventing the defendant from 
reoffending (where the defendant is a natural person, this is usually through a term of 
imprisonment or a restrictive community-based sentence).26 The aim of rehabilitation is to 
address the underlying issues and causes of the original offending.27 A rehabilitative focus 
can prevent recidivism.28 Restitution is the one purpose which focuses on the victim. It seeks 
to repair the harm and provide the victim with some kind of compensation (either financial or 
non-financial).29  
 
When sentencing a natural person, the court focuses on the relevant aims which best fit the 
needs of the individual, the victim, and the community.30 While imprisoning a natural person 
may simultaneously achieve all of the purposes of sentencing that the court considers 
necessary (excluding restitution), this is not possible for a corporation. The different penalties 
available for corporations focus on different and specific sentencing purposes. Therefore, it is 
important they are used in conjunction. For example, financial penalties focus on retribution, 
denunciation, deterrence, and material restitution. The various forms of non-financial 
penalties can focus more on deterrence, rehabilitation, and non-material restitution. 
																																																								
21 Ross Grantham and CEF Rickett (eds) Corporate Personality in the 20th Century (Hart Publishing, United 
Kingdom, 1998) at 12-13. 
22 Crimes Act, s 177. 
23 Sentencing Act, s 7. 
24 Sections 7(a), 7(b) and 7(e). 
25 Section 7(f). 
26 Section 7(g). 
27 Section 7(h). 
28 Andrew Ashworth “Responsibilities, Rights and Restorative Justice” (2002) 42 Brit J Criminol 578 at 590-
592. 
29 Sections 7(c) and 7(d). 
30 Sentencing Act, s 8. 
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Therefore, it is important that both the range of sentences which can be imposed and the 
range of purposes which need to be met are considered. This consideration allows the court to 
come up with flexible outcomes which can be tailored to fit the needs of each case. By doing 
this, the most effective result can be obtained. This paper will consider each of the sentencing 
options in turn. 
 
IV Financial Penalties 
 
The first option to consider when sentencing a corporation is the imposition of a financial 
penalty. The court has a broad jurisdiction to impose this sanction as section 6 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act 2011 provides that if an imprisonable offence is committed by a 
body corporate, the court can impose a financial penalty instead. In addition, this approach is 
reflected in other jurisdictions, as the starting point for sentencing a company in the United 
Kingdom is the imposition of a financial penalty.31 
 
Two separate forms of monetary penalty could be imposed: reparation and/or fines. 
Reparation is aimed at providing compensation to the victim(s) and their families.32 The 
focus on the victim helps repair some of the harm that has been caused. Thus the aim of 
reparation is financial restitution. Fines are aimed at punishing the company and deterring 
future harmful conduct.33 The focus on the offender is a deterrent which contributes to 
reducing the rate of recidivism. These two forms of reparation should initially be considered 
separately before the court considers the totality of the financial penalty.34 
 
A Determining an Appropriate Quantity 
 
A primary issue to consider is the inherent difficulty in determining an appropriate quantum 
of financial penalty to impose. This is because there are a number of both quantitative and 
qualitative factors that could be taken into account. In Department of Labour v Hanham & 
Philip Contractors Ltd, the court offered some guidance on imposing financial sentences. A 
basic three step methodology is used. The first step involves fixing the amount of reparation. 
																																																								
31 Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 (England and Wales), s 1(6). 
32 Sentencing Act, s 10; Department of Labour v Pike River Coal Ltd, above n 6, at [8]-[9]. 
33 Mobile Refrigeration Specialists Ltd v Department of Labour (2010) 7 NZELR 243 (HC) at [10]-[11]. 
34 Department of Labour v Hanham & Philip Contractors Ltd (2008) 6 NZELR 79 (HC) at [33]. 
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The court considers any offers to make amends and the financial capacity of the defendant. 
Reparation is to be given primacy over fines because the money goes directly to 
compensating victims and repairing harm. The second step involves fixing the amount of any 
fine. Here, the court set out three bands of seriousness as a starting point.35 Low culpability 
offences would attract a fine of up to $50,000 while for medium culpability offences, a fine 
between $50,000 and $100,000 would be appropriate. The court indicated that a fine over 
$100,000 would be expected in cases of high culpability, but the upper limits of this have yet 
to be determined. The maximum penalties need to be reserved for the worst kind of case.36 A 
further issue involves adequately categorising offences into each band of seriousness. This 
involves a value judgement and each case needs to be decided on its facts. 
 
In addition, the English Sentencing Council has devised a number of non-exhaustive 
aggravating and mitigating factors that a sentencing judge could use after the initial 
assessment of seriousness.37 Aggravating factors include foreseeability of serious injury, the 
degree of negligence, the number of injuries, and failure to respond to warnings. Mitigating 
factors could involve prompt acceptance of responsibility, cooperation with the investigation, 
and a previously responsible attitude towards health and safety. A sentencing judge in New 
Zealand could adopt a number of these guidelines when determining an amount. 
 
A further issue arises when setting financial penalties in the case of a more serious offence, 
such as health and safety offending or corporate manslaughter. There is an inherent difficulty 
involved in placing a quantitative value on the loss of life or compensating for psychological 
harm, as both of these factors are qualitative in nature. Farish J admitted that this troubled her 
when establishing the figures in the Pike River case.38 Financial penalties can be more easily 
imposed when there is some measurable harm caused. For example, in cases of wilful 
damage or theft, the value of property can be reasonably ascertained using a more simple 
mathematical formula. 
 
For manslaughter and other serious crimes that involve violation of personal freedoms, the 
courts generally do not have to make this financial assessment. They usually impose a term of 
																																																								
35 At [51]-[60]. 
36 R v Taueki [2005] 3 NZLR 372 (CA) at [25]. 
37 Sentencing Guidelines Council Corporate Manslaughter & Health and Safety Offences Causing Death 
(February 2010) at 4. 
38 At [8]. 
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imprisonment.39 The offender loses a substantial amount of their personal liberty and this is 
generally seen as a sufficient penalty following the commission of such a serious crime.40 
However, in cases involving loss of life, it is impossible to specify a term of imprisonment or 
any other sentence which deprives the offender of their liberty. Here, the artificial nature of 
the company makes sentencing problematic. Producing an adequate financial penalty is a 
difficult exercise for any court, as they need to impose a particularly severe financial penalty 
in order for this to compare to imprisonment. In addition, imposing a fine for culpable 
homicide may downgrade the seriousness of the offence as offenders face only deprivation of 
material welfare as consequence. Therefore, it may be beneficial for the court to consider 
sanctions against the individual directors involved in managing the company despite the 
company as a whole being the one convicted. Further discussion of individual sanctions is 
included later in Part VII. 
 
Another serious issue in regard to setting an amount is whether the size of the company 
should be relevant to the financial penalty imposed. The English Sentencing Council has 
rejected a fixed correlation between penalty and means of payment as inappropriate on the 
basis that it could lead to vast discrepancies in quantum of penalty.41 The preferred approach 
is to assess each case on an individual basis by looking at assets, profit, and turnover. The 
sentencing court can then consider what level of fine inflicts a meaningful punishment. 
However, linking the size of the company to the amount to be paid can reduce the issue of 
wealthy companies being able to essentially pay to break the law, as these larger corporations 
have to pay a greater sum. 
 
B Effect on Companies with Different Wealth Bases 
 
A major issue with imposing a financial penalty is that a wealthy corporation can effectively 
purchase the right to break the law. Following conviction, they can simply pay a lump sum. 
Companies with a large profit may not be significantly deterred from negligent and risky 
practices if they do not fear the imposition of a financial penalty, especially if the gains from 
omitting to install safety procedures outweigh any penalty which could be imposed.42 This 
																																																								
39 Crimes Act, s 177. 
40 Rajesh Chhana and others The Sentencing Act 2002: Monitoring the First Year (Ministry of Justice, March 
2004) at 22-23. 
41 Sentencing Guidelines Council, above n 37, at 5-7. 
42 Sentencing Guidelines Council, above n 37, at 3-4. 
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may create an unfair distinction between large corporations and small to medium enterprises 
by giving large corporations the power to avoid satisfactory legal sanctions. 
 
On the other hand, companies with very little profit and companies who have become 
insolvent may not be able to pay any financial penalties involved. A company is deemed 
insolvent if one of two conditions are met: either the company is unable to pay its debts as 
they become due in the normal course of business or the value of the company's assets is 
greater than the value of its liabilities, including contingent liabilities.43 If a company is 
insolvent, they lack capacity to pay any financial penalties imposed. 
 
This is problematic as these financial penalties would only be effective if the company had 
the capacity to pay them. If the company does not (as was the case in Department of Labour v 
Pike River Coal Ltd), they can simply ignore the sentence imposed and the court has no legal 
recourse. Thus, very unprofitable companies can avoid financial sanctions entirely. If an 
insolvent company can avoid paying financial penalties, not only can they evade effective 
sanctions, but the government could be called upon to fund any required compensation.44 
Therefore, it is important to consider the various ways courts could impose operative 
financial penalties when the company is insolvent. 
 
V Possible Solutions to the Problem of Insolvency 
 
A Mandatory Life Insurance Coverage 
 
A possible solution for the issue of imposing financial penalties on insolvent companies 
would be to institute a certain amount of mandatory life insurance coverage, which each 
company must pay for. Following the Pike River disaster, Kevin Hague branded the 
company’s life insurance coverage of $2 million as “totally inadequate”.45 This approach 
would ensure that companies cannot avoid liability because their life insurance coverage is 
unsatisfactory and would seek to pre-emptively address the issue of insolvency. It also 
guarantees families receive compensation. However, this requirement may be seen as too 
																																																								
43 Companies Act, s 4(1). 
44 (3 December 2013) 695 NZPD 15118. 
45 Laura Mills “Coal company sentenced for Pike River deaths” New Zealand Herald (New Zealand, 5 July 
2013) <nzherald.co.nz>. 
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onerous and therefore harmful to businesses.46 In addition, it would be difficult for 
Parliament to devise a concise set of rules for determining what level of insurance coverage is 
mandatory. The potential formula would have to take into account the type of industry and 
the level of danger involved. An assessment of individual circumstances may also be relevant 
as various entities could have different levels of health and safety control. Using these 
qualitative characteristics to develop a quantitative figure would be controversial. Parliament 
could expect a range of submissions from interested parties. 
 
B Altering the Order of Pari Passu 
 
Another potential solution would be for legislation to change the order of pari passu. This 
refers to the order in which unsecured assets are paid out to creditors during liquidation. The 
various creditors are ranked and the company’s remaining assets are divided according to this 
order.47 The order is found in Schedule 7 of the Companies Act 1993. It consists of the 
following: liquidator, employees, Internal Revenue Department, unsecured debts, 
subordinated debts, preferential shares, and finally ordinary shares. Once an entire level 
within the ranking has been compensated, the next level can be paid. Once the remaining 
assets are depleted, all levels below receive nothing.  
 
Reparation could be given greater priority within the ranking system and this may make the 
company more capable of paying these orders. However, there are two significant issues with 
this approach. Firstly, it would give deserving creditors such as the liquidator and employees 
less priority. It is important to incentivise the role of the liquidator by ensuring this person 
receives compensation.48 Also, employees are not involved in management failures so it 
would be unfair not to pay them for their contributions.49 Secondly, in addition to these 
injustices, the shareholders are likely to already be left with nothing as they are at the bottom 
of the ranking. Therefore adding a new creditor has the potential to leave their level of 
compensation unaltered and as such, it may not provide an effective deterrent. Altering the 
order would, however, promote reparation as it is likely to offer a higher level of 
compensation to the victim(s). Despite the lack of deterring value, giving the reparation order 
																																																								
46 Joseph Stiglitz and Carl Walsh Principles of Macroeconomics (4th ed, WW Norton & Company, United 
States of America, 2005) at 77-80. 
47 Companies Act, s 312 and 313. 
48 Paul Heath and Mike Whale Insolvency Law in New Zealand (2nd ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2013) at 362-
363. 
49 At 363. 
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greater priority at least ensures victim(s) receive some form of payment. This measure 
therefore focuses more on restitution as opposed to other aims of sentencing. 
 
C Imposing Financial Penalties in Order to Shame the Company 
 
Another solution could be that financial penalties are imposed with a shaming effect in mind, 
rather than an expectation that the amount should always be paid in full. Using this approach, 
a court can impose a quantity deemed adequate to punish the corporation. The company can 
then apply to the court, stating their financial incapacity to pay and the court can opt to 
waiver part or all of the penalty based on the company’s financial position. This could 
provide some level of deterrence as the amount of the original penalty can be made public. 
The imposition of such penalties could be an effective sentencing option as it still labels and 
stigmatises the corporation as criminal.50 
 
However, there are some issues inherent in this approach. This method could undermine the 
credibility of the sentencing court as it shows other convicted entities that they may not have 
to adhere to the sentence imposed. In addition, it does not provide a substantive solution to 
the problem of insolvency as these companies still do not have to factually pay the full 
amount. Victims still do not receive the amount of reparation that is due. The punishment 
may also fail to provide adequate deterrence as companies with a low wealth base know they 
can avoid harsh financial penalties. 
 
Additionally, it is arguable that this approach is inconsistent with legislative intention. Under 
section 41 of the Sentencing Act 2002, the court must consider the offender’s financial 
capacity to pay when imposing any fines. This requirement has also been followed in 
subsequent case law.51 Therefore, it could be argued that the wording of this provision and 
later precedent indicate this type of sentencing practice is unacceptable. 
 
However, there is an argument to be made that the offender’s financial capacity is only a 
relevant factor and is not a mandatory consideration. The wording of section 41(2) states that 
if the court is uncertain about the offender’s ability to pay the fine, “the court may direct the 
offender to make a declaration as to his or her financial capacity”. Therefore, based on the 
																																																								
50 Eric Rasmusen, above n 15, at 521. 
51 Department of Labour v Hanham & Philip Contractors Ltd, above n 34, at [71]-[73]. 
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wording of the section, the only strict requirement is that the court be made aware of the 
offender’s financial capacity. It is not essential to take this into account. Therefore, the courts 
have the ability to interpret the provision as they see fit and this sentencing option could still 
be feasible. As mentioned, this approach was taken by the sentencing judge in Department of 
Labour v Pike River Coal Ltd.52 
 
D Moral Expectation That the Individuals Involved Pay 
 
Financial penalties could also be imposed without acknowledging the ability of the company 
as a construct to pay. Instead, the court could focus on pressuring the directors and 
shareholders to cover the penalty. In Department of Labour v Pike River Coal Ltd, Farish J 
encouraged the directors and shareholders to pay the compensation instead of the company.53 
However, only moral pressure can be applied and this cannot be enforced as the company has 
a separate legal identity from the directors and shareholders.54 In addition, this kind of 
pressure may not be effective because there is little incentive for management to acquiesce to 
such a demand beyond goodwill. This is illustrated by the Pike River shareholders’ response 
to the request of the judge: 99 percent voted against contributing to the payment.55 
 
Also, even applying this kind of moral pressure is in stark opposition to the concept of 
separate legal corporate personality, which has been clearly provided for in the legislation 
and is grounded in policy considerations. When shareholders invest in a company, they are 
not expected to contribute anything more than the value of their shares.56 Thus, any approach 
based on holding individuals liable would be inconsistent with express legislative intention. 
In addition, it is important that shareholders are not held personally liable for any harm as this 
would deter healthy risk taking which is important to commercial growth.57 Shareholders 
need to be prepared to make difficult investment decisions and to take calculated risks. 
Therefore, any corporate conviction where the subsequent sentence was pressured on to an 
individual could be seen as unfair. Due to the problems involved in imposing financial 
																																																								
52 At [19]. 
53 At [20]. 
54 Companies Act, s 15. 
55 Thomas Mead “Shareholders deny Pike River families’ reparation” 3 News (New Zealand, 30 October 2013) 
<3news.co.nz>. 
56 Companies Act, s 15. 
57 Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC 22 at 25. 
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penalties on an insolvent corporation, the court may need to look at non-financial options as 
well. 
 
VI Non-Financial Penalties 
 
If the court cannot impose financial penalties due to insolvency yet still wants to impose an 
effective sanction, there are a range of alternative penalties that could be used. These 
penalties could also be imposed on a profitable company in conjunction with other sanctions. 
This would be useful as financial penalties only provide retribution, denunciation, deterrence, 
and financial restitution. It would be beneficial for the court to consider rehabilitative 
measures and non-financial restitution as a means of effectively sanctioning the prohibited 
conduct and assisting the victim. These alternative sanctions were introduced by the 
Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 (England and Wales) and 
subsequently developed by the Sentencing Guidelines Council. 
 
A Formal Apology 
 
A preliminary and simple option would be that the company must issue a formal apology, 
expressing remorse for the systemic failures that resulted in death.58 The company must 
outline in detail what led to the failures and accept accountability for any positive 
wrongdoing or negligence. It would also be beneficial for the corporation to express some 
genuine remorse.59 In addition, the formal apology results in a shaming effect which should 
produce deterrence. The apology can provide some redress to the victim(s) and assist in their 
healing process. If no other sentence is effective, a formal apology can at a minimum, have 
some restorative impact. 
 
Restorative justice is beneficial due to its focus on the victim, as opposed to merely holding 
the company accountable. There can be some attempt to repair the harm that has been 
caused.60 This can promote the victim’s recovery.61 In addition, a formal apology may be 
more effective than financial reparation in the sense that the corporation must express 
																																																								
58 See also “Apology for Pike River families, manslaughter charge considered” 3 News (New Zealand, 6 
November 2012) <3news.co.nz>. 
59 Rajesh Chhana and others, above n 40, at 9-10. 
60 Andrew Ashworth, above n 28, at 584-585. 
61 Rajesh Chhana and others, above n 40, at 8. 
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genuine guilt and regret. This could help to repair emotional damage more effectively than 
receiving any material benefit such as a share of the company’s profit. 
 
B Publicity Order 
 
A second option is that the company must issue a publicity order.62 The company must give a 
public announcement which outlines the fact of conviction, specified particulars of the 
offence, the amount of any fine, and the terms of the remedial order. This allows the public to 
understand what has happened, thereby producing bad publicity. The aim of this order should 
be both general and specific deterrence. Business should suffer if the company is forced to 
openly admit their negligence led to serious harm. The value of any trademark and goodwill 
is also likely to diminish.63 
 
Another advantage of a publicity order stems from the reliance sentencing courts need to 
place on social stigma rather than substantive penalty. This ties back to the idea that 
traditional sanctions for offending that focus on deprivation of liberty cannot be applied to a 
company. In addition, the imposition of a financial penalty may also be inadequate if the 
company has a large profit base or is insolvent. Therefore, an alternative such as a publicity 
order could provide an effective mechanism for stigmatising and labelling the corporation as 
a criminal. 
 
However, the effectiveness of this order may be limited in two key ways. Firstly, there is 
likely to already be a large amount of media scrutiny and public outcry following corporate 
offending (especially in cases involving a loss of life).64 Therefore, it is arguable that a 
publicity order does not add anything substantive to the company’s situation. However, when 
a company issues such an order, they are forced to acknowledge the harm caused and take 
full responsibility. Therefore, a publicity order could be a useful mechanism to promote 
accountability. 
 
Secondly, the effectiveness of the publicity order may be limited by the ability of the 
company to rebrand following a conviction for a serious offence. This problem arises from 
																																																								
62 Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act, s 10. 
63 Richard J Varey and others New Zealand Law for Marketers (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2009) at 87-111. 
64 See also “Pike River ruling proves need for corporate manslaughter law – unions” ONE News (New Zealand, 
5 July 2013) <tvnz.co.nz>. 
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another significant difference between the natural and legal person: the legal person is 
artificial and can easily be redesigned or dissolved.65 For example, following the sinking of 
the MS Herald of Free Enterprise, the company involved changed its name and repainted all 
of the ships in their fleet.66 It could be advantageous to introduce a corollary to this order: that 
the company cannot rebrand in any substantial way until a set period of time has passed. To 
refine this rule, the courts would need to indicate what “substantial” meant and Parliament 
would need to set an adequate time period for prohibition. However, this restriction on 
intellectual property could also be controversial as it limits freedom to use personal property 
in a significant way.67 
 
C Remedial Order 
 
A final option could be to give the company a remedial order prior to sentencing, ordering 
them to remedy specific failures.68 As the formal apology outlines what failures led to the 
loss of life, the company can then use this to provide remedies. Once the company has 
successfully done this, the court may view their actions as a mitigating factor at sentencing. 
This order is unique in that it focuses heavily on rehabilitation. An order with a rehabilitative 
purpose is advantageous as it seeks to eliminate the failures which led to the conviction and 
ensure it does not happen again.69 The courts also have to address the level to which the 
failure has been redressed. The current legislation specifies that employers must take “all 
practicable steps” to ensure potential harm is managed.70 Therefore all health and safety 
precautions are a question of degree and need to be considered on an individual basis.71 
 
D Limited Effectiveness of Non-Financial Penalties 
 
These penalties may not be effective in cases where the company is insolvent. This is 
particularly problematic as non-financial penalties are primarily aimed at insolvent 
corporations. A primary issue is that there may be no adequate enforcement mechanism. In 
																																																								
65 Trade Marks Act 2002, sections 9 and 10. 
66 Monopolies and Mergers Commission Report into the Merger of P&O and European Ferries Group Plc 
(Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, December 1986). 
67 JT International SA v Commonwealth of Australia [2012] HCA 43 at [193]. 
68 Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act, s 9. 
69 Kaye McLaren Reducing Reoffending: What Works Now (Department of Justice, Wellington, 1992) at 20. 
70 Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992, s 2A. 
71 “Taking all Practicable Steps” (July 2011) Department of Labour <dol.govt.nz>. 
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the United Kingdom, the legislation specifies that failure to comply with either a publicity 
order or a remedial order is a separate offence and incurs a financial penalty.72 However, this 
system of enforcement is ineffective in cases of insolvency as the company is unable to pay 
this penalty. Thus, there is no motivation for an insolvent company to comply with any of the 
orders. 
 
Secondly, the company needs to have the resources to adhere to the penalties imposed. The 
formal apology and publicity order both involve some expenditure as the company must 
investigate what failures led to death. Therefore, these options are still financial in nature, 
albeit indirectly. Likewise, compliance with a remedial order is very costly. If the company is 
insolvent, then they are unlikely to have the resources to complete these requirements 
efficiently and effectively. In addition, if the company is already insolvent and unlikely to 
pay any financial penalties, the effectiveness of offering a mitigating factor at sentencing is 
limited. The court needs to rely on moral pressure and public demand, which may be 
insufficient when a request of such high expenditure is made.  
 
Thirdly, the company might no longer continue to trade following the conviction, so there is 
no specific deterrence involved in any of the non-financial penalties. If the company is due to 
be liquidated and dissolved, there is no deterrent when a formal apology or publicity order is 
issued. The negative public reaction does not make a difference to the profits of the company, 
as these are already zero following dissolution. In addition, there is no point in issuing a 
remedial order if the company is going to cease trading, as the harm is already prevented. 
This was the case for Pike River Coal Ltd, which was placed into receivership in 2010 and 
has since been on an indefinite trading halt.73 These issues are indicative of the problem 
inherent in penalising a company for any crime where the company plans to dissolve and 
cease trading. It may be best to reserve prosecution for cases where the company has 
expressed a plan to continue operation, as there is little public interest in prosecuting a 
corporation in liquidation. However, this option is still problematic as a convicted company 
in liquidation is able to avoid any liability or sanction. 
 
VII Imposition of Penalties on Individuals 
																																																								
72 Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act, ss 9(5) and 10(4). 
73 Gyles Beckford “NZ Oil & Gas places Pike River Coal in receivership” Reuters (Wellington, 13 December 
2010) <reuters.com>. 
20 
 
 
A Jurisdiction 
 
Due to the problems involved in sanctioning the company as a whole, it is practical for the 
courts to consider sentencing the individual managers involved. This method reverts the 
sentencing process back to an individual level and could be more effective as the justice 
system is based on this personal approach. The court could use both financial and non-
financial penalties to sanction the individuals involved. Proposals will focus on a legal 
expectation that the individuals involved will pay and a ban on being involved in future 
management. Some academics have recommended the imposition of a term of 
imprisonment,74 but this is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
A preliminary issue here is ascertaining whether the courts have jurisdiction to sanction 
individuals involved in corporate management. In England and Wales, section 18 of the 
Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 specifies that no individual can 
be guilty as a party to a corporate offence. However, this legislation does not specifically 
prohibit the imposition of a sanction against an individual involved in managing a convicted 
company. Therefore, even if New Zealand were to adopt a model based on this foreign 
legislation, there may be some scope for individual sanction. 
 
When the issue of sentencing individuals within a corporation following the conviction of the 
entity as a whole arises, it is important to firstly distinguish between the role shareholders and 
directors play within the enterprise. The shareholders act as the owners of the company while 
the directors manage its operations. There is separation of these two functions.75 The 
shareholders have very limited control over the actions of the directors.76 Therefore, it is only 
feasible to punish directors, as they are the only true actors who can control the company’s 
functions. This fits with Cooke J’s “doctrine of identification” principle as the courts must 
identify which individuals are controlling the corporation.77  
 
																																																								
74 Sarah-Lee Stead and Nora Taefi “Should New Zealand Introduce Corporate Manslaughter?” ISN Magazine 
(July 2012). 
75 Henry Hansmann, Reineir Kraakman and Richard Squire “Law and the Rise of the Firm” (2006) 119 Harvard 
Law Review 1333 at 1336-1337. 
76 Companies Act, ss 165, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173 and 174. 
77 Nordik Industries v Inland Revenue Department [1976] 1 NZLR (SC) at 199. 
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It could be seen as unfair to punish individuals when the corporation as a whole was 
convicted. This is because the blame was attributed to the entire company as no one person’s 
actions could be found to be a substantial cause of death. Therefore, it is arguable that finding 
a series of systemic failures to be the problem would prohibit individual sanction. However, 
if individual accountability can be proven, it may be more acceptable. A practical approach 
would be to hold the company liable as a whole, but sanction individuals when it can be 
proven that their conduct contributed to the harm. This causative link is an additional element 
for the prosecution to prove before individuals can be sanctioned without a personal 
conviction. The proof of this subsidiary element is essential to the imposition of sentences 
against individuals. If a system was developed whereby the corporation as a whole was to be 
convicted beyond reasonable doubt, but the involvement of the specific individual sanctioned 
only had to be proven on the balance of probabilities, this could overcome the inability to 
find an individual guilty. The justification for using the civil burden in this context is 
analysed later in this Part. 
 
B Legal Expectation That the Individuals Involved Pay 
 
A primary option could be to impose financial penalties on the directors involved. Directors 
owe certain fiduciary duties to the company and can be personally liable for any breaches.78 
Therefore, if the entity as a whole is convicted of an offence, the sanctions may be able to be 
placed on the individual directors responsible. Despite the problems with jurisdiction to 
impose financial liability directly onto individuals, there is some scope for this in the current 
legislation. 
 
Under section 135 of the Companies Act 1993, directors breach their duties when they allow 
a “substantial risk of serious loss” to the company’s creditors. Thus, the courts have found 
that directors can be individually liable when there is illegitimate risk-taking.79 Under section 
301 of the 1993 Act, the court may order a negligent director to pay a certain amount during 
the course of liquidation. Thus, there is the possibility to impose financial penalties on 
individuals.80 Utilising this section also avoids the problem of directors being unable to take 
calculated risks. As long as the choices made by directors are reasonably viable, there is no 
																																																								
78 Companies Act, ss 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137 and 301. 
79 Mason v Lewis [2006] 3 NZLR 225 at [48]. 
80 Ross Grantham and CEF Rickett (eds), above n 21, at 108-115. 
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finding of fault. This encourages directors to exercise due diligence and care while promoting 
healthy risk-taking. 
 
Parliament may choose to use this legal expectation of behaviour for corporate offending as 
well. The legal precedent for a breach of section 135 is set at a high threshold.81 An 
appropriate sentencing provision for corporate offending could be that financial penalties are 
imposed directly on individuals following an entity’s conviction for a criminal offence when 
directors can also be found to be in gross breach of the duties owed to the company. By 
imposing this kind of individual liability, the court could ensure any financial penalties are 
paid. This also means shareholders still have limited liability and as such, it should not hinder 
healthy business investment. It is not a viable argument to say this deters viable business risk-
taking because directors are concerned about facing personal liability. To avoid this problem, 
the courts can continue to apply this kind of personal liability only when the negligence 
reaches a very high standard.82 
 
C Ban directors from Managing another Company 
 
Another form of individual sentencing for corporate offending would be to impose individual 
non-financial penalties straight onto the directors. There is scope within the current 
legislation for the imposition of this type of individual liability as well. Under section 385 of 
the Companies Act 1993, an individual director may be banned from managing another 
company for a period of up to ten years.83 This can be done if three conditions are met. 
Firstly, the directors’ company must be insolvent. Secondly, the Registrar of Companies or 
Financial Markets Authority must be satisfied that the director has been involved in 
mismanagement. Thirdly, there must be a causal link between this mismanagement and the 
insolvency.84 The legislative precedent from this section could be used to develop a set of 
rules around punishing individual directors for corporate offending in a comparable way.  
 
The object of the current legislative provision is to protect the public from future 
mismanagement.85 Therefore, the aims of the sanction include both deterrence and 
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83 Subsection 3. 
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incapacitation. The capacity for this sanction to incapacitate a responsible director is unique 
in the sense that it fully prevents liable directors from being involved in the management of 
another company. This promotion of public welfare would be a key advantage of introducing 
some kind of individual non-financial liability following the conviction of a corporation. 
 
D Burden of Proof 
 
The potential for individual sanction raises the issue of to what standard the prosecution must 
prove the subsidiary element (the individual’s actions were a cause of the offence). 
Proceedings are brought against the corporation because the actions of no single individual 
can be established beyond reasonable doubt as the operative cause of the offence. Therefore, 
the civil standard needs to be used in order to impose sanctions on the individuals.  
 
This issue should first be analysed with reference to the current legislation, as this shows 
legislative intention in this area. Section 385 states that such an order can be made if the 
relevant authority is “satisfied” the director was responsible for the problem. This indicates 
the burden of proof in the current legislation is based on a lower standard than the criminal 
one of beyond reasonable doubt.86 The wording of section 135 contains no guidance as to 
burden of proof, but in subsequent cases, the civil standard has been used.87 In addition, both 
offences are civil in nature, which implies the balance of probabilities is appropriate. On the 
other hand, while both section 135 and section 385 are civil in nature, they are used as a basis 
for expanding liability for individual directors to a criminal (as well as civil) area. Therefore, 
the criminal standard may need to be used.88 However, a rational counter-argument to this 
proposition is that the individuals are not being convicted of an offence, penalties are merely 
be applied. Therefore, the proposed changes could be conceptualised as more civil in nature 
than criminal. 
 
VIII Recommendation for Reform 
 
Following this discussion of the various sentencing options that should be considered, it is 
helpful to analyse which mechanisms should actually be implemented. The reform should 
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focus on the development of coherent standards as this will reduce judicial discretion and 
lead to more consistent sentencing outcomes. It is appropriate to follow the approach in the 
United Kingdom and use the imposition of a financial penalty as the starting point. The 
quantum of any financial penalty should be determined with reference to established rules. 
The focus should be on reparation orders rather than fines because these orders offer 
compensation to the victim(s). Reparation can focus both on punishing the offender and on 
remedying the harm.89 In determining the totality of any penalty, the court should consider 
the nature of the offence, then the seriousness of the offence, before finally applying relevant 
aggravating and mitigating factors. A particularly severe penalty should be imposed in cases 
involving a loss of life. There needs to be a severe deprivation of material benefit in order to 
compare to a term of imprisonment. In addition, the court should factor in the size of the 
company as this will mitigate the problems surrounding a wealthy company effectively being 
able to break the law. A large discrepancy in penalties will be appropriate in these 
circumstances. 
 
Reform in this area will also need to centre on mechanisms to overcome the issue of 
insolvency. A primary recommendation is the implementation of mandatory life insurance 
coverage. This proactively avoids any problems with a corporation’s inability to pay and 
should be an effective measure alone. The order of pari passu should not be altered as it is 
important that deserving creditors such as the liquidator and employees receive 
compensation. In addition, there should be no financial penalty imposed where the company 
is unable to pay as this both undermines the sentencing court and places undue pressure on 
shareholders to contribute. 
 
It is important that all three non-financial penalties are used. This is due to their varying 
focuses. While all of these penalties have a broad application, the primary emphasis of the 
formal apology is on the victim, the publicity order focuses on the offender, and the remedial 
order seeks to benefit the broader community by protecting from future harm.  Therefore in 
every case, a formal apology, publicity order, and remedial order should be imposed. As 
mentioned, these measures may have limited effectiveness when the company ceases to trade 
following conviction. However, it is still appropriate to apply them for the restorative benefit 
and deterrent value. 
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In addition, the legislature should consider imposing financial and non-financial penalties 
directly onto the individuals responsible if some causation can be shown between their 
actions and the resulting harm. This ensures financial penalties can be paid and protects 
society by preventing negligent directors being involved in future mismanagement. The 
measure is also beneficial as it guarantees individual directors cannot become immune from 
sanction on the basis that they were acting for a company at the time of the offending. 
 
A Application of Law Reform 
 
Each case ultimately needs to be decided on its facts. Therefore, it is useful to consider ways 
these mechanisms could be applied to the sentencing case of Department of Labour v Pike 
River Coal Ltd. These proposed reforms could be effective if a situation like the Pike River 
disaster ever reoccurred. In that case, the company had entered insolvency and would cease to 
trade following the imposition of sentence. Therefore, the obligation to pay a financial 
penalty would be prima facie inadequate. The primary mechanism to overcome insolvency 
(mandatory life insurance coverage) could have been utilised as the company did not have 
satisfactory coverage. If this requirement was mandatory, the company would have been in a 
better position to pay the reparation order and fine. 
 
The court could then consider non-financial options. A formal apology and publicity order 
would force the company to take responsibility for the failures that led to death and would 
have an emotional and restorative benefit for victims. However, both a publicity order and a 
remedial order would serve little purpose as the company was going to cease operations 
following sentencing. 
 
The final option for the court would be to impose some kind of individual sanction on the 
responsible directors. During the course of the litigation, the Chief Executive Officer, Peter 
Whittall, was charged with 12 health and safety violations. These charges were later dropped 
due to insufficient evidence and the court was unable to impose any sanction directly against 
this individual.90 An additional aspect of sentencing for corporate offences could be the 
ability to punish the natural persons responsible. This should only be done when some 
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individual accountability is attributable.91 If the lesser standard of the balance of probabilities 
was used to sanction individuals involved in a convicted corporation, some kind of penalty 
may have been available for certain directors. This could firstly involve requiring directors to 
pay the financial penalties from their own personal wealth, which would promote deterrence 
and ensure families receive compensation. In addition, directors could be prohibited from 
being involved in corporate management for a specified period of time, which would protect 
the public.  
 
For this case, an appropriate outcome would be a formal apology to the families of the 
victims. To provide material compensation, this order could be combined with some kind of 
individual financial liability for certain managers. In addition, responsible directors could be 
barred from future corporate management to protect the public. Analysis of this situation 
shows how cases need to be examined on an individual basis. 
 
IX Conclusion 
 
Criminal law generally focuses on convicting and sentencing human beings for wrongful 
conduct. However, corporations can and do still cause harm. The justice system needs to find 
a way to effectively penalise corporate conduct. As this paper has discussed, the issues 
present in corporate liability cases are not limited to only problems with conviction. 
Following a finding of guilt, it can still be difficult to impose an effective sentence on a 
corporation, particularly in cases involving the highest level of harm: loss of life. Due to the 
artificial nature of a corporation, courts will need to adopt a different set of penalties and use 
these in conjunction. A broad range of financial and non-financial penalties should be 
available at both the corporate and individual level. 
 
Sentencing courts should focus on adopting a basic methodology in order to apply sanctions 
consistently. Consideration should first be given to the imposition of a financial penalty and 
the company’s ability to pay this should be assessed. Focus should then shift to non-financial 
options. The court can use these penalties either in conjunction with a financial order (to 
achieve a broader range of sentencing aims) or in isolation (if an insolvent corporation cannot 
afford to pay). Finally, the court needs to determine whether individual sanction is 
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appropriate by considering the level of personal involvement of directors. With this creative 
new variety of options, effective corporate sentencing can be possible. 
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